Research Article

DIRECTORS’ SHAREHOLDING AND NIGERIAN BAILED-OUT BANKS’ PERFORMANCE

Nuraddeen Shehu Aliyu1*
1 Department of Accounting, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Nigeria
* Corresponding author: nsaliyu99@yahoo.com
Published: Dec, 2014
Pages: 115-128
Views: 33
Downloads: 10

Abstract

This paper extends an earlier proposed framework and thus empirically examining the effect of board of directors’ share ownership on the non financial performance of banks in an era of post banking crisis that called for a bailout reform in Nigeria. This board characteristic is adopted to address a peculiar ownership structure problem in the banking sector, and consistent with the board monitoring functions as underpinned in agency theory. Based on a survey data, the result of this analysis revealed a significant relationship between board of directors’ share ownership and banks performance (financial and non-financial). This research therefore, suggests more regulation and enforcement of this as it motivates and compels boards to be more vigorous at monitoring CEOs/top managements.

Keywords

Corporate governance Directors shareholding Banks performance Agency theory

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How to Cite

Aliyu, N. S. (2014). DIRECTORS’ SHAREHOLDING AND NIGERIAN BAILED-OUT BANKS’ PERFORMANCE. Nigerian Journal of Accounting Research, 10(2), 115-128.

N. S. Aliyu, "DIRECTORS’ SHAREHOLDING AND NIGERIAN BAILED-OUT BANKS’ PERFORMANCE," Nigerian Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 115-128, December 2014.

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